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Abstract
We construct an equilibrium on-the-job search model in which workers value
wages and amenities. We show by example that in a standard (Burdett/Mortensen)
model with a distribution of worker tastes over amenities, worker mobility
need not imply equilibrium wage dispersion.
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1 Introduction
Models of on-the-job search o¤er an explanation for wage di¤erentials across
identical workers. With on-the-job search, rms can be indi¤erent between
low and high wage o¤ers. A rm that o¤ers a low wage has di¢ culty attract-
ing and retaining workers, but its prot per worker employed is relatively
high. A rm that o¤ers a high wage nds it easier to attract and retain work-
ers, but its prot per worker employed is relatively low. On-the-job search
thus introduces the volume-margin tradeo¤ that lies behind theories of
equilibrium wage dispersion.
In most models of on-the-job search, e.g., Burdett and Mortensen (1998),
a workers decision to move from one rm to another is based solely on the
wages o¤ered by the two rms. However, non-wage characteristics likely also
play an important role. (See Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2009, and Sullivan and
To, 2014, for empirical evidence.) A worker may prefer rm A to rm B even
though B o¤ers a higher wage if he or she prefers the amenities associated
with rm A to those associated with rm B.
In this note, we examine an equilibrium model of on-the-job search in
which workers care both about wages and about job-specic amenities. We
use a framework dened by two further assumptions. The rst is that work-
ers have heterogeneous preferences over non-wage characteristics, i.e., we
assume horizontalrather than verticaldi¤erentiation across job ameni-
ties. Second, we assume that worker preferences over these amenities are
private information. These assumptions imply that rms cannot use their
wage o¤ers to pricethe non-wage characteristics of their jobs.1
We focus on a particular question, namely, when workers care about both
wages and amenities, does on-the-job search necessarily lead to equilibrium
wage dispersion as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998)? The answer is no.
Using a uniform distribution, we show by example that if preferences over
the amenity are su¢ ciently dispersed, there is an equilibrium in which all
rms post the same wage.
1Other models of equilibrium search in which workers care both about wages and
amenities include Hwang, Mortensen and Reed (1998) and Albrecht and Jovanovic (1986).
In Hwang et al. (1998), workers all have the same known preferences over amenities.
Amenities can thus be priced, so the model is one of compensating di¤erentials as in Rosen
(1986), and the equilibrium is essentially that of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) except
that rms o¤er ow utilities rather than wages. Albrecht and Jovanovic (1986) make the
same assumptions (horizontal di¤erentiation, private information) that we do but without
incorporating on-the-job search. That paper compares the equilibrium job acceptance
decision of the unemployed in a random search model like ours to the corresponding
decision in a competitive search benchmark.
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2 Model
We use the simplest version of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) as our starting
point. Time is continuous, and only steady states are considered. There are
unit masses of homogeneous workers and homogeneous rms, and all agents
have a zero rate of time preference. Firms live forever. They receive revenue
p per worker employed per unit of time and maximize expected steady-state
ow prot. Workers have nite lives, exiting the market at Poisson rate
: These exits are o¤set by the entry of new workers into unemployment. Job
o¤ers arrive at Poisson rate ; the same whether employed or unemployed,
and jobs end (workers move from employment to unemployment) at Poisson
rate : Workers maximize expected lifetime payo¤s.
When a job o¤er arrives, the worker draws a match-specic ow pay-
o¤ (amenity), ", and the rm o¤ers a wage w on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
The amenity is a random draw from an exogenous continuous distribution
function  (") with corresponding density ("); which is symmetric around
zero with support [ "; "]. The realization of this draw is the workers private
information. Wage o¤ers are distributed across rms according to an endoge-
nous distribution function F (w) with support [w;w]: A worker who accepts
a job o¤ering wage w and amenity " realizes a ow payo¤ of z = w + " for
the duration of the match. Convolution then gives a continuous distribution
of ow payo¤s across job o¤ers:
H(z) =
Z w
w
 (z   w)dF (w): (1)
Unemployed workers receive ow payo¤ b < p: An unemployed worker thus
accepts a job o¤er if and only if its ow payo¤, z; is at least as great as b: An
employed worker accepts a new job if and only if its ow payo¤ is strictly
greater than the current jobs ow payo¤.
We begin by characterizing the relevant steady states. Using these steady
state measures, we then derive rmssteady-state ow prots. Let u denote
the steady-state measure of unemployed workers. The inow to unemploy-
ment during any time interval of length dt equals the ow of workers from
employment into unemployment plus the new entrants who replace workers
who exit the market from employment, i.e., ( + )dt(1   u). The corre-
sponding outow is dt(1 H(b))u, so in steady state,
u =
+ 
+  + (1 H(b)) : (2)
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Next, let G(z) denote the proportion of employed workers receiving ow
payo¤ of z or less. Note that G(z) = 0 for z < b . Hence, for z  b;
the inow of unemployed workers to employment with a payo¤ z or less
is dt[H(z)   H(b)]u. The outow is given by those workers who exit the
market or were displaced from employment or who received an o¤er with a
payo¤ greater than z, i.e., [+  + (1 H(z))]dtG(z)(1  u); so in steady
state,
G(z) =

[H(z) H(b)]
+  + (1 H(z))

u
1  u: (3)
Now consider a rm o¤ering a wage w such that w + "  b; and let
L(zjw) denote the steady state number of workers receiving ow payo¤ z in
this rm. The ow of such workers into the rm in any time interval of length
dt consists of the unemployed workers who contacted the rm and drew a
match-specic payo¤ " = z   w  b plus the employed workers with ow
payo¤ less than z who contacted the rm and drew the same " = z w: The
hiring inow is thus dt [u+ (1  u)G(z)] (z   w) while the corresponding
outow is [+  + (1 H(z))]dtL(zjw). Substituting (2) and (3) into the
hiring rate and equating inows to outows gives
L(zjw) = (+ )(z   w)
[+  + (1 H(z))]2 : (4)
This describes the steady state number of workers with ow payo¤z employed
at a rm o¤ering w  b  ":
A rm o¤ering wage w thus has an expected labor force of
L(w) =
Z w+"
max[b;w "]
(+ )(z   w)
[+  + (1 H(z))]2dz
and an expected steady-state prot of

(w) = (p  w)L(w): (5)
The lower limit in the integral dening L(w) reects the facts that (i) no
worker will accept a job o¤ering z < b and (ii) the lowest ow payo¤ at
a rm o¤ering w is w   ": Each rm chooses its wage to maximize 
(w)
given the distribution of wages posted by other rms and the optimal search
strategy of workers. Let 
 = maxw 
(w):
2.1 Equilibrium
Denition: An equilibrium is a quadruple fu; F;G;Hg such that
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(i) workers search optimally given H;
(ii) u;G and H are consistent with steady state given wage o¤ers F and
optimal worker search;
(iii) rms choose wages to maximize 
(w) given the all other rmswage
o¤ers and the optimal search strategy of workers.; i.e.,

(w) = 
 for all w where dF (w) > 0;

(w)  
 for all w where dF (w) = 0:
As p > b, each rm can o¤er a wage that attracts some workers and
makes positive expected prot. That is, in equilibrium 
 > 0.
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show that when   is degenerate, the
equilibrium wage o¤er distribution cannot have mass points. If there were
a mass point, say at ~w < p, a rm o¤ering ~w would strictly increase its
expected prot by o¤ering ~w + , where  > 0 is arbitrarily small. This
deviation would increase the hiring rate of the rm discontinuously, while
the prot per hire would decrease continuously. However, when workers
job acceptance decisions also depend on a continuously distributed match-
specic component, as considered here, the hiring rate no longer need be
discontinuous at a mass point. Hence, one cannot a priori rule out the
possibility of mass points in F .
In the next section we analyze the conditions under which a single-mass-
point equilibrium exists. In such an equilibrium, all rms o¤er the same wage
and workers change jobs purely due to their preferences over amenities. To
illustrate this we restrict our analysis to the case in which   is uniform on
[ "; "]:
3 Single-wage equilibrium
Consider a candidate equilibrium in which all rms o¤er a wage w0. Let
L(w;w0) be the expected workforce of a potential deviant o¤ering wage
w; and let 
(w;w0) be the corresponding expected prot ow. Since F is
degenerate at w0; we have H(z) =  (z   w0): Thus

(w;w0) = (p w)L(w;w0) = (p w)
Z w+"
max[b;w "]
(+ )(z   w)
[+  + (1   (z   w0))]2dz:
In a single-wage equilibrium, there is a unique w0 such that w0 = arg max 
(w;w0):
A su¢ cient condition for the existence of a unique single-wage equilibrium
is therefore the existence of a unique w0 such that 
0(w0;w0) = 0 and

00(w0;w0) < 0:
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Whether such an equilibrium exists depends, of course, on the distrib-
ution of the match-specic amenity. If, in particular, the distribution of "
is degenerate at zero (the case considered in Burdett and Mortensen 1998),
then a single-wage equilibrium does not exist. For other amenity distribu-
tions, however, a single-wage equilibrium does exist. We illustrate this by
considering the case in which " is uniform on [ "; "]: In this case, we show
that if the amenity distribution is su¢ ciently dispersed, i.e., if " is su¢ -
ciently large, then an equilibrium exists in which all rms post the same
wage. Specically, we show
Proposition 1 Let " be uniform on [ "; "] with "  (p b)

+  + 
3(+ ) + 

:
Then there exists a unique single-wage equilibrium.
To verify this, we proceed as follows. Let w0 be the candidate equilibrium
wage, and let z0 = w0   " and z0 = w0 + " be the lowest and highest ow
payo¤s workers can achieve in the candidate equilibrium. Since " is uniform
on [ "; "]; we have (z   w) = 1=2" and  (z   w0) = (z   w0 + ")=2".
Assuming that z0  b (an assumption that we will show follows from the
restriction placed above on "), the expected steady-state prot for a rm
posting wage w when all other rms post w0 is

(w;w0) = (p  w)
Z w+"
b
2"(+ )
[2"(+ ) + (w0 + "  z)]2dz:
Note that 
(w;w0) = 0 for w + "  b (since no workers will accept a wage
below b) and that 
(w;w0)  0 for w  p: That is, the rms optimal wage
must lie in [b  "; p]:
Using a change of variable and integrating,

(w;w0) =
(p  w)2"(+ )(w + "  b)
[2"(+ ) + (w0   w)][2"(+ ) + (w0 + "  b)] : (6)
Di¤erentiating with respect to w and letting a = 2"(+ ) then gives

0(w;w0) =
a
a+ (w0 + "  b)

[a+ (w0   w)][b  "  w] + (p  w)(a+ (w0   b+ "))
[a+ (w0   w)]2

:
(7)
Any critical value w must therefore solve the quadratic equation
[a+ (w0   w)][b  "  w] + (p  w)(a+ (w0   b+ ")) = 0: (8)
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In any candidate equilibrium w0  b ", so evaluating 
0(w;w0) at w = b "
yields

0(b  ";w0) = a(p  (b  "))
[a+ (w0   (b  "))]2 > 0:
Since (i) 
0(b   ";w0) > 0; (ii) 
(b   ";w0) = 
(p;w0) = 0; and (iii) (8)
is a quadratic equation, it follows that there is a unique w 2 (b   "; p)
that solves equation (8) and that this critical value maximizes rather than
minimizes the rms expected prot.
The nal step is to nd a w0 that is its own best response. To do so we
solve equation (8) letting w = w0. The equilibrium w0 then solves
(p  w0) = a(w0 + "  b)
[a+ (w0 + "  b)] : (9)
To show that a unique solution exists, note that the LHS of equation (9),
	1(w0) = (p   w0); is a strictly decreasing linear function of w0 that goes
from 	1(b   ") = p   b + " to 	1(p) = 0 while the RHS, 	2(w0) =
a(w0 + "  b)
[a+ (w0 + "  b)] ; is a strictly increasing and concave function that goes
from 	2(b   ") = 0 to 	2(p) = a(p+ "  b)
[a+ (p+ "  b)] > 0. Continuity of 	1
and 	2 implies a unique intersection. That is, there exists a unique w0
that solves equation (9). The wage w0 maximizes each rms steady-state
expected prot given that all other rms post w0:
Finally, we provisionally assumed that z0  b. Equation (9) gives a
parametric restriction on " such that this inequality holds, namely, " 
(p  b)

+  + 
3(+ ) + 

. To see this, suppose z0 = w0   " = b: In this case,
the equilibrium wage not only satises equation (9) but also satises the
restriction w0 = b + ". Substituting the latter expression into equation (9)
and solving for " yields
" = (p  b)

+  + 
3(+ ) + 

:
From equation (9), w0 is decreasing in ": Thus, as " increases, z0 = w0   "
decreases, and the assumption that z0  b remains valid.
4 Conclusion
In this note, we have constructed an equilibrium on-the-job search model
in which workers care about both wages and amenities. We have shown by
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example that in a standard on-the-job search model, worker mobility need
not imply equilibrium wage dispersion.
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